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University of Iowa, College of Law
This paper examines a particular type of contracts: the agreements produced by divorcing couples. 
Virtually required by many states, they are, in theory at least, closely monitored by courts since, when 
children are involved, they will be incorporated into court orders. The parties to these unhappy contracts 
are attempting to minimize losses, rather than maximize gain. How are contracts structured that will 
do this, and how does a difference in the size or power of the bargaining entities change the final 
settlement or contracting result? This empirical study not only considers how the contractual terms come 
to be, but also what effect they have over a five-year period, with an eye to seeing which contracts 
produce (or are at least consistent with) further litigation, and which correspond with adjustment over 
time. The role of lawyers in the entire process is also a focus of the inquiry. Special attention is paid to 
the role of fault, with surprising results in a no-fault system. All divorce stipulations for parents of 
minor children filed in Johnson County, Iowa, during 1998 provide the beginning data, supplemented 
by other court records in each case.  
My first introduction to law and economics was not Richard Posner’s (1987) 
“market for babies,”1 but Mnookin and Kornhauser’s (1979) “Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law,”2 which stands, as my teaching interests have, at the 
∗ Research assistant Nicholas Keppel xeroxed nearly all of the material used in this study, kept 
accurate and extensive notes on what was not copied, and coded the data from the agreements. 
Katie Brinig spent many hours scanning the documents so they were in usable (and portable) 
form. Iowa colleagues who have given useful comments include Stephanos Bibas, Herb 
Hovencamp and Gerald Wetlaufer. Colleagues from other schools and disciplines who’ve been 
very helpful include Douglas Allen and Steven Nock. This paper was presented at Washington 
University in St. Louis and at the Canadian Law &and Economics Assoc.iation annual meeting in 
Toronto, 2003. I also wish to acknowledge helpful suggestions made by two anonymous 
referees. 
1 The original paper containing the basic idea was Landes and Posner (1978). 
2 The idea and the title have spawned a number of papers, in family law as well as other fields. 
For family law pieces, see Bix (1998) (problems with enforcement when the judgment of makers 
of agreements is clouded by love); and Wax (1998) (women have the best bargaining power 
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intersection of dispute resolution and family law. Through the years, 
“Bargaining in the Shadow” has remained one of my favorites, both because it 
is so teachable and because it holds so many interesting ideas. In practice, as 
with many theoretical models, Mnookin and Kornhauser’s predictions do not 
always bear out. Their punch line is that with the change in custody laws (or 
endowment points) from a nearly infallible presumption in favor of the 
wife/mother to an indeterminate best-interest-of-the-child standard, women 
should lose. Because they would be willing to settle to avoid even a small 
chance of loss of custody of their children, Mnookin and Kornhauser postulate 
that women should get less in property in an indeterminate custody system 
than they would under the older maternal preference rule. 
What empirical research shows is that even with changes in child custody 
regimes, not much has changed—neither with the way parents share custody 
time, nor with the way they (and courts) divide property.3 Nor, as we will see 
from the empirical investigation that follows, does what other couples get 
when they go to court relate very closely to what most couples settle for on 
their own.4
Scholars explain these apparent deviations from the Coase theorem (Coase, 
1960)5 in a number of ways. Some argue that the legal change did not bring 
about distributional changes because there were (and are) significant 
transaction costs associated with divorce. That is, the rate of divorce changed.6
before marriage). For others, see, e.g., Rossi (2001); Hoffmann et al. (2001); Busch and 
Reinhardt (2000); Dana and Koniak (1999); O'Rourke (1997); Yarkon (1997); Ford (1995); 
Standen (1993); and Goldberg (1987). 
3 For previous considerations of the problem, see Brinig and Alexeev (1993); Garrison (1991); 
Kelly and Fox (1993); and Landes (1978). For example, Weiss and Willis (1993:629, 656, Table 4) 
show that divorced wives with children received a mean of $9313 in no-fault states, compared to 
$5220 in fault states (as we define them). In most of these studies, however, the difference in 
payouts is not significant. 
4 The couples who actually litigate divorce cases, as we will see, differ from those who settle in 
a number of ways. Though the law (legislated and common law) certainly applies to both the 
litigating and settling groups, the litigators in family law seem prepared to sacrifice not only 
material resources but the well-being of their children to make a point. Mnookin and 
Kornhauser (1979) mention this, but in the context of the greater willingness of mothers to 
settle. The litigators thus are those who chose the “threat point,” or BATNA in the language of 
dispute resolution, see Fisher and Ury (1991). 
5 The Coase theorem, at least in its incarnation that people should bargain to an efficient 
outcome regardless of the way the law allocates rights, was first applied to changes in divorce 
laws in Peters (1986). For other studies of the effect of the change in laws on divorce rates, see 
Marvell (1989:544); Nakonezy et al. (1995); and Allen (1992). See also Parkman (1992); and 
particularly Friedberg (1998). 
6 See Brinig and Buckley (1998:325-40 and sources cited therein), and sources cited in footnote 
6 above. Contra, see Ellman and Lohr (1998). 
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(As a practical matter, the lowering of the general transaction costs associated 
with proving grounds for divorce might be cancelled out by the increased 
transaction costs involved with proving “best interests.”)7 Mnookin (and others 
working with him) explained that although the awards under the new statutes 
themselves might change, people would, despite the legal awards, eventually 
settle into the more familiar pattern of maternal custody and paternal visitation 
(Maccoby and Mnookin, 1992). Or there simply might be a change in the 
frequency of going to court rather than settling (and a corresponding lowering 
of amounts paid to lawyers, increasing the couple’s financial pie).8
This article offers another look at Mnookin and Kornhauser’s bargaining 
paradigm, using the lens of socioeconomics.9 This nomenclature hints that the 
result will be more nuanced, that feelings and distributional consequences will 
factor in to the account, and that any model offered will be subject to the 
scrutiny of empirical testing and “real life.” More generally, I hope to begin a 
discussion of bargaining not merely in the shadow of the law, but also through 
the powerfully distorting lens of violated trust. I ignore for the sake of 
simplicity, and as Mnookin and Kornhauser do, the large and growing number 
(recently at least 50 percent) of couples who are childless at divorce,10 since 
divorce bargaining in these cases feels one- rather than two-dimensional. We 
are left with the fairly typical case of a couple with at least one minor child, in 
7 Proving best interests may require the use of expert psychological or psychiatric testimony, as 
proving adultery or abuse typically does not. In conflicted cases, states may require appointment 
of a guardian ad litem for the child, and the cost will typically be assessed to the parents. For 
example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 310 (1998) states, "The court may 
appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor or dependent child with respect to his 
support, custody, and visitation." This section of the UMDA has been adopted in Illinois, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington. According to Elrod and Spector (2000:865, 
909, Chart 2), attorneys for children or guardians ad litem are required in 39 states plus the 
District of Columbia. For a description of how children actually work with their lawyers, see 
Buss (1999). Alternatively, Mechoulan (2001) shows first a rising and then a falling of divorce 
rates after no-fault. His explanation is that people are taking the new rules into account and 
delaying marriages, producing better marriages over time. The explanation above may also be 
true—the undoubted decrease in transaction costs produced by no-fault may cancel, in effect, 
with the increase in costs brought about by the subsequent change in custody rules. 
8 See, e.g., Brinig and Alexeev (1993). 
9 For a description of the field, see Harrison (1999).  
10 In our sample of Johnson County divorces, 169 of 348 couples, or 48.9%, had minor 
children when they divorced, so to call it a significant minority is not really accurate. For data on 
the number of children involved in 1989-90 divorces by state, see Clarke (1995:13, Table 4): “In 
1989 and 1990, just over half of the divorcing couples had children under 18 years of age at the 
time of their divorce, while 47% were childless or had children who were older than 18 years of 
age.”. Similar data from Oregon in 2002 indicate 7,411 couples with at least one minor child out 
of 16,583 (44.6%). 
"Unhappy Contracts":  The Case of Divorce Settlements / 243
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1007
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
perhaps a 5-10 year marriage that has, in the language of cooks, “turned.” 
Perhaps it does not matter why, but a marriage which had begun with trust, 
hope and self-sacrifice has devolved into an exchange model (with tit-for-tat 
bargaining) (Hanson, 1991),11 perhaps into what Lundberg and Pollak (1993) 
call the “Separate Spheres” marriage12 and, finally, to impasse.  
At a core level, the couple no longer trusts (Brinig and Nock, 2003). My 
guess, though I have no data and am uncertain how I’d get it, is that, as with 
most other problems in marriage, this lack of trust can be found 
symptomatically or causally in their sexual relationship.13 One spouse (or both) 
may actually violate the trust by becoming involved sexually outside the 
marriage. One spouse (or both), even though not physically involved, may 
accuse the other of infidelity or the legally lesser “disloyalty.”14 Or, perhaps 
more commonly still, one (or both) spouses may feel that the other no longer 
takes his/her sexual needs fully into account. One spouse may not trust the 
other for romance or orgasm. 
At any rate, one spouse, typically the wife (Brinig and Allen, 2000), cannot 
handle the current unhappiness and files for divorce. Armed by counsel,15 and 
perhaps under the watchful eye of a mediator,16 bargaining ensues.  
What happens to each spouse’s feelings during this transitional period? Both 
spouses will, to a greater or lesser degree, feel confused (or conflicted), afraid 
(of the unknown future), depressed17 (for to fail at marriage is, after all, to fail 
at something important), and lonely (since he or she probably has lost essential 
communication with the other spouse).18 The primary custodial parent may 
11 For a discussion of the problems of tit-for-tat in marriage, see Brinig (2001). “Tit-for-tat” 
comes from the bargaining literature. See generally Axelrod (1984). 
12 In this unhappy marriage, couples descend to performing only the stereotypical husband and 
wife gender roles, with the man being merely a good provider and the wife merely a good 
homemaker. This situation is similar to what Lloyd Cohen (1987:300-301) hypothesized for 
specific performance of marital services.  
13 For an attempt to answer some of these questions using empirical data, see Allen and Brinig 
(1998). 
14 A cultural anthropologist who studies infidelity is William Jankowiac (1989). See also Fisher 
(1992). 
15 In our sample of 140 cases with minor children under 14, all but 10 of the wives were 
represented, and all but 47 of the husbands. Only two of the petitioners, both wives, were 
unrepresented. In those states where there are streamlined divorce procedures, it is more 
common than not for couples to be unrepresented. In Oregon in 1996, 64.5 percent of couples 
divorced with neither having counsel. 
16 In the 1998 Johnson County sample, only three cases were resolved by a mediator. 
17 For a discussion of the stages of divorce and the attorney as a guide to the client’s 
progression through them, see Leatherby (1987:25). 
18 See Nock (1998) and Marks (1996) for two discussions of this phenomenon. 
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also feel angry (for having to deal with grieving children) and overwhelmed (by 
having to work and bearing nearly sole responsibility for household and child 
care).19 Yet she will usually fare better psychologically because the routine, 
though complicated, at least resembles the old life (Whitehead, 1997:78; 
Reissmann, 1990:165). The non-custodial spouse may well feel violated as does 
the victim of a burglary.20 He may also feel blind-sided and surprised.21 
We might expect several typical outcomes of divorce bargaining. One would 
be an extension of the “separate spheres,” or minimal performance, solution 
envisioned for unhappy couples who stayed married in Lundberg and Pollak 
(1993). The authors argued that instead of threatening divorce, an exit strategy, 
couples who were no longer happy would revert to the minimum performance 
required of husbands and wives, or “separate spheres” behavior. That is, wives 
would perform as good housewives,22 and husbands as good breadwinners,23
because they could not be criticized by outsiders or their spouses for playing 
these roles.24 
In a related vein, we might expect behavior to cluster around certain foci or 
norms, as anticipated by Richard McAdams in his important paper on social 
norms (McAdams, 2000).25 The prediction for these contracts would be a 
strong similarity of contract terms. In fact, both predictions seem borne out by 
my study of Michigan interconnection agreements (Brinig, 2004). In that study, 
19 See, e.g., Grillo (1991), Marks (1996). 
20 For a discussion of depression in non-custodial fathers, see Brinig and Nock (2003) (nearly 
half a standard deviation more depression, even controlling for the divorce and economic events 
in their lives). 
21 There are cases in which husband or wife trusts the attorney for the other, when that is not 
advisable. Examples include Hale v. Hale, 539 A.2d 247 (Md. App. 1988) (wife trusted husband 
that separation agreement was precondition to their reconciliation, apparently until husband 
borrowed her suitcases to take his paramour on a vacation); and Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 
1286 (3rd Cir. 1979)( in which wife systematically bilked the unsuspecting husband of his 
considerable assets before leaving the marriage). There is also some evidence that men are more 
than occasionally surprised when their wives file for divorce. See Braver et al. (1993) (using the 
NSFH, authors note the large number of husbands who were surprised when their wives filed 
for divorce). 
22 For example, they would ask for primary custody and would seek a share of the marital 
home rather than income-producing assets. See Weitzman (1985). 
23 Some evidence of the phenomenon (without clear directions for the causation) can be seen 
in Johnson (1999). Divorcing husbands would want very definite terms and see responsibility 
primarily through their financial contributions. See Fay (1989). 
24 The most powerful discussion of this role stereotyping phenomenon appears in Grillo 
(1991). 
25 For a discussion of social norms generally, see Posner (2000). 
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many of the variables we examined had only one or two solutions and gave 
tremendous power to the incumbent telephone company. 
All of these strategies speak of minimizing losses, or minimax, a term coined 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern in their discussions of game theory.26 To 
repeat, unlike most contracts, through which parties seek to maximize profits, 
unhappy contracts feature terms designed to minimize the losses of at least one 
contracting party. Though one spouse must ultimately file for divorce, spouses 
typically do not do so joyously and with great thought of profit, but reluctantly, 
fearfully, and with some sadness.27 Divorce usually is a last resort, an admission 
that one has made a mistake or that difficulties just could not be worked out. 
Divorce is the lesser of two evils (the greater seen as staying married).28 The 
contract itself is another step towards admitting failure. The goals may be to 
shorten the waiting period,29 to prove that divorce is sought (or at least 
uncontested) by both,30 and to establish some financial or other certainty for a 
dependent spouse.31 Although there is no conclusive proof of what is the worst 
loss for divorcing parents, recent empirical,32 legal,33 and political activities34
suggest that it may be the loss of custody, and even more, the loss of a 
meaningful relationship with one’s child. 
26 This later turned into the book “The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.” (von 
Neumann and  Morgenstern, 1944). 
27 I note the parallel with some wedding ceremonies. See, e.g., http://www.chicagoweddingrev.com 
/sampleceremonies.html; and http://www.manchester. gov.uk/registrars/marriages/cermns.htm.
28 See, e.g., Landes (1978). 
29 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 20-91(9) (six months separation if no children and an agreement). 
30 See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 598.8 (2001).  
31 Compare ALI Principles, § 4.01 (3) (“The objective of this Chapter is to allocate property by 
principles …that are consistent and predictable in application.”), and § 7.02, comment (b), at 
956: “Agreements also give parties greater certainty about the future, and about the 
consequences of their actions.” 
32 See, e.g., Brinig and Allen (2000) (custody arrangements at divorce seem to drive which 
spouse will file) and Brinig and Nock (2003) (divorced men significantly more likely to be 
depressed if they also lose custody of their children). 
33 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting a non-
custodial parents’ challenge on due process grounds to the custody standard of “best interest”). 
See also Kozlowski (2004). For a website collecting information on the class action litigation 
(against “unconstitutional custody statutes”) now filed in 50 jurisdictions, see 
http://www.indianacrc.org/.  
34 See, e.g., Ill. H.B. 5214 (c): “Unless the court finds the occurrence of ongoing abuse as 
defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, the court shall presume 
that the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, 
moral, and emotional well-being of their child is in the best interest of the child. There shall be a 
presumption in favor of joint custody, provided that both parents agree to that custody 
arrangement.” 
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How are contracts structured that will reduce these losses, and how does a 
difference in the size or power of the bargaining entities change the final 
settlement or contracting result? Considering these contracts as a whole, the 
reader is struck with how franchise-like they are.35 Many of them (and 
particularly the ones that have been successfully amended over time), give great 
power to the custodial parent because so much is left unspecified (that is, 
relational). On the other hand, many of the more successful contracts are for 
relatively short periods of time (one to three years before modification based 
upon the children’s age).36 Because they are for more than one year, they are 
nonetheless candidates for analysis as relational contracts (Speidel, 2000). 
Most relational contracts literature begins with the work of Stewart Macaulay 
(1963), who studied the contracting practices of Wisconsin firms in the early 
1960s.37 More recently, Professor Ian Macneil (Macneil, 1980; Trebilcock, 
1993) 38 and former Dean Robert Scott (Scott, 1987; Goetz and Scott, 
35 For a law-and-economics discussion of franchise arrangements, see Hadfield (1990). For its 
theoretical application to families, including divorcing families, see Brinig (1996) and Brinig 
(2000:188-91, 194-96). 
36 Consensual modifications to the contracts occurred more often when the oldest child was 
older (i.e., when the time for performance was relatively short). 
37 Macaulay found that the parties specified time of performance, price, and quantity, but left 
most other terms unspecified. They did not resort to legal enforcement when they “cancelled a 
contract,” but rather freely adjusted contractual relations as they went along. Macaulay (1977) 
later extended his work to several foreign countries. In a more recent empirical look at contract 
terms, Russell Weintraub (1992) sent a questionnaire to general counsel for 182 firms eliciting 
information on contract practices and views as to desirable contract policy. Two of Weintraub’s 
respondents were from “utilities other than gas or electricity” (1992:16). Information included 
contract devices used to protect against market shifts during long-term contracts, the frequency 
with which companies request relief from or modification of contractual obligations, the results 
of such requests, and the use of and extent of reliance on firm offers. Weintraub also asked 
whether corporate executives would make more or less legalistic responses to a set of three 
hypothetical business problems than would general counsel (1992:1-3). Weintraub stresses 
nonlegal remedies such as reputation costs, but notes the increased use of litigation for contract 
disputes, and the tendency of judges to award even punitive damages for breach of contract 
cases (Weintraub, 1992:7-8, n.28):  
In California from 1980 to 1984, "punitive damages were assessed against 35% 
of defendants who were found to have breached contracts" (Peterson et al., 
1987:viii). From the 1960s to the 1980s, the number of punitive damage awards in 
business contract cases more than quintupled in Cook County, Illinois, and more 
than quadrupled in San Francisco. The total awards in constant dollars increased 
from less than $500,000 in each of those jurisdictions in the 1960s to $14 million in 
Cook County and $17 million in San Francisco during the first five years of the 
1980s (Peterson et al., 1987:23-24).  
38 See also Macneil (1978). For a recent discussion of Macneil’s work, see Speidel (2000). For a 
highly critical essay, see Barnett  (1992). 
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1981:1149; Scott, 2000:849-53; Goetz and Scott., 1980:1300; Scott, 1990)39
have taken up the challenge of writing about relational contracts, each 
generating several useful papers on the subject. Macaulay, Macneil and Scott all 
assume that in complex, long-term contracting, many terms will be left 
deliberately vague or not included at all. The parties, because of the strength of 
their relationship and the substantial investments each has in the venture,40 are 
likely to mutually agree to alter the contract as things change.41
Thus, Macneil’s colleague Richard Speidel writes in a recent piece (that also 
summarizes previous scholarship on relational contracting): 
First, the exchange relationship extends over time. It is not a "spot" 
market deal. Rather, it is more like a long-term supply contract, 
franchise or distribution arrangement, or a marriage. Second, because of 
the extended duration, parts of the exchange cannot be easily measured 
or precisely defined at the time of contracting. This dictates a planning 
strategy that favors open terms, reserves discretion in performance to 
39 See also Scott and Scott (1998) (relational contracting theory applied to family law); and for 
related work see Ayres and Gertner (1989). All these works suggest that the courts will fill the 
gaps left in contracts with “default rules”: What the parties would probably have agreed to had 
they thought about the problem at the time of contracting. But see Schwartz (1992) (concluding 
that courts, lacking sufficient information about party intent and market alternatives, are 
reluctant to intervene if the parties have failed to agree). 
40 On the role of reputation as a substitute for contract remedies, see Kornhauser (1983). See 
also Scott (1987:2026-27); Gillette (1985:559-60); and Milgrom et al. (1990:3): "It is well 
known...that in long-term, frequent bilateral exchange, the value of the relationship itself may 
serve as an adequate bond to ensure honest behavior and promote trust between the parties." 
For example, see Gillette (2002:1168): “Reputation is particularly effective in relational situations 
because long-term contracts tend to be incompletely contingent; as a consequence, the specific 
obligations of the parties, and hence the existence of breach, are highly uncertain. Ex post 
enforcement costs will therefore be high, and ex ante constraints such as reputation can 
therefore compensate for the risk of underenforcement.” 
41 Weintraub (1992:19-21) notes: “Relational contracts involve parties who are presently 
performing a long-term contract or have dealt with one another many times in the past and are 
likely to do so in the future. Discrete contracts involve parties who have not dealt with one 
another before or, if they have, probably will not contract again. Relational contracts are likely to 
predominate in well-organized markets; discrete contracts will typify sales that take place 
sporadically, such as sales of real estate. There are important differences between situations in 
which parties have developed a relationship and those in which the contract is an isolated 
occurrence. When a dispute arises, parties with a history of mutually beneficial dealings are less 
likely to resort to litigation than are strangers. Efficiency is one incentive for amicable resolution 
of a relational dispute. Each party has custom-shaped its operations to meet the other's needs 
and these transaction costs would be wasted if the relationship ended. Moreover, in well-
organized markets where relational contracts predominate, a reputation for litigiousness is 
particularly undesirable.” [citations omitted].  
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one or both parties, and incorporates dispute resolution procedures, 
such as mediation or arbitration, into the contract. The inability of the 
parties to "presentiate" the terms of the bargain at the time of 
contracting shifts the focus to circumstances and conduct that occur ex 
post contract. Third, in the words of Lewis Kornhauser, in a relational 
contract the "interdependence of the parties to the exchange extends at 
any given moment beyond the single discrete transaction to a range of 
social interrelationships." [citations omitted]  (Speidel, 2000:823-24)42
The current examination of divorcing couples combines relational contracting 
and family law. I set out to discover, if possible, why couples choose particular 
terms in their settlement agreements (called stipulations in Iowa) and how 
these contractual arrangements fare over time. 
I began with the complete set of divorce files initiated in 1998 in Johnson 
County, Iowa.43 These were set apart for me and my research assistants in a 
series of file drawers in the Johnson County courthouse, where they become 
public records when the divorce is final. The divorce was final in 348 of the 
cases. From these cases, we eliminated all those with no minor children, since 
these were less likely to involve complex bargaining and unlikely to require 
adjustment over time.44 This meant that 175 cases were eliminated. We also 
eliminated the 29 cases in which the only children involved were over 14 at the 
time of filing, since we believed these would not require adjustment over a long 
time horizon: our goal was to have around five years’ experience with the 
contracts. We therefore worked with 140 cases. 
We xeroxed and then scanned major documents in each case,45 and kept 
notes describing other court contacts, identifying later motions,46 stipulations,47 
42 For other work, see Speidel (1985:483-579, selected bibliography in app. A). The existence 
and importance of relational contracts in the real world has also been verified in an empirical 
study (Weintraub, 1992:16-24). 
43 This is the county encompassing Iowa City and the University of Iowa. According to the 
2000 Census, Johnson County has a population of 111,006. It is one of the most educated 
counties in the country, with 47.6% of its population having at least a bachelor’s degree 
(compared to less than 25% nationally), and has a median household income of $40,060. It is 
one of the most racially diverse counties in Iowa, with nearly 10% of residents being nonwhite. 
44 For these couples, it is far more likely for a no-fault divorce to be a “clean break,” the goal 
sought by family law reformers. 
45 In each case, this included the Petition for Dissolution, Affidavits of Financial Status filed by 
both parties, their written stipulation, if they had one, and the Final Judgment of Dissolution. 
Because there were children, Iowa requires each couple to attend a parenting class. Since there 
was one in each file, the parenting class-associated documents were not included. Some cases 
had Motions for Temporary Relief with attached affidavits: these were xeroxed. 
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and adjustments. For each case, we coded basic demographic data,48 data that 
potentially involved any power each spouse might have (such as income level 
and independent wealth),49 the names of the attorneys, if any, for each spouse, 
which spouse filed the case, and whether the case was resolved through 
stipulation (the local name for a property settlement agreement). We noted the 
type and number of actions prior to the divorce as well as those that followed 
the divorce. We noted the custody arrangement,50 whether or not there was 
substantial visitation (which we defined as thirty percent of the time or more), 
whether or not the parties had a complicated visitation schedule (by number of 
paragraphs, which varied from 0 to 21), whether or not they imposed 
limitations on leaving the state, whether they provided for religious training of 
the children, whether or not the parties agreed to child support significantly 
deviating from the statutory guidelines,51 whether they provided for the college 
education of children, whether there was alimony (found in only 7 percent of 
the settled cases), how the divorcing spouses divided various classes of assets, 
how they agreed to deal with modifications, and so forth. 
Consistent with prior studies, most of these cases settled before the divorce 
hearing: 88 percent used contracts to settle all matters dealing with custody and 
visitation, child support, property division and alimony.52 Also consistent with 
prior studies, wives brought the vast majority of the divorce actions (78 
46 These most frequently included motions to change custody, motions to prevent relocation, 
and motions of various kinds to collect child support. 
47 Most frequently, these were changes in custody or visitation arrangements, or were to note 
that amounts owed had been paid. Some were also for changes in the amount of agreed-upon 
support. 
48 This included the date of marriage (from which the length of the marriage could be 
calculated), the dates of birth of husband and wife (from which the ages of husband and wife, 
and the age of wife at marriage could be calculated), the number, ages and genders of the 
children, income of the wife, income of the husband, independent assets of the wife, 
independent assets of the husband, and assets over $100,000. 
49 Education levels, highly correlated with employment prospects, would have been valuable 
but simply were not available in the vast majority of cases. 
50 Custody arrangements were classified into husband custody, joint custody (nearly a 50-50 
share), or wife custody.  
51 Iowa Child Support Guidelines appear in Iowa Court Rule Chapter 9, and the worksheets for 
calculating the guideline amount appear in Court Rule 9.13. Guidelines are required by the Social 
Security Act, Child Support Enforcement Assistance Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §658, and have 
been criticized by both wives (as not meeting their children’s needs, see Comment to § 3.04, 
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution at 435-36, 2002) and 
husbands (Ward, 2003). For an analysis of the debate, see Betson et al. (1992). 
52 The 90% settlement figure comes from Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979). See also Maccoby 
and Mnookin  (1992). 
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percent). Nearly all (90 percent of the divorces) involved “joint legal 
custody.”53 Sixty-nine percent involved generous sharing of custody, though 
only 7.1% (10 cases) had approximately equal time shares. Only another 10 
cases had father custody. These Johnson County marriages lasted slightly 
longer than was found in divorce studies that do not involve only couples with 
minor children,54 averaging almost exactly 11 years before divorce. 
Iowa adopted a no-fault law in the 1970s.55 This means that, legally, fault is 
completely irrelevant in the state. It makes no difference to whether or not, or 
how soon, a complainant can obtain a divorce. It also cannot affect the amount 
of alimony or property distribution a spouse receives.56 Thus, fault does not 
appear in the legal pleadings themselves, even for one spouse to obtain some 
advantage. Nonetheless, the divorcing spouses in Johnson County (or their 
lawyers) could not restrain themselves from putting allegations of fault 
53 The Iowa Code, in § 598.41 (5) (2001) provides: “Joint physical care may be in the best 
interest of the child, but joint legal custody does not require joint physical care….If one joint 
custodial parent is awarded physical care, the parent responsible for providing physical care shall 
support the other parent’s relationship with the child. Physical care awarded to one parent does 
not affect the other parent’s rights and responsibilities as a joint legal custodian of the child. 
Rights and responsibilities as joint legal custodian of the child include, but are not limited to, 
equal participation in decisions affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education, 
extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.” 
In contrast, Michael Newdow, the plaintiff in the recent Supreme Court case of Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (2004), did not have prudential standing to attack the 
pledge of allegiance under the Establishment Clause because his former wife had “‘sole legal 
custody as to the rights and responsibilities to make decisions relating to the health, education 
and welfare of ’ her daughter” (at 2310).  
54 Such studies report an average length before divorce of seven years. For a review, see Allen 
and Brinig (1998). 
55 The sections were added by Acts 1970 (63 [Iowa] G.A.) ch. 1266, §§ 1et seq., now codified at 
Iowa Code §§ 598.3 et seq. (2001). Fault is irrelevant to prove divorce, for under § 598.8 (2)(1) 
(2001) (governing cases that do not require a hearing), the petitioner must show that “The 
parties have certified in writing that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to 
the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no 
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.” In other cases, Iowa Code § 598.17 
(2001) provides that “A decree dissolving the marriage may be entered when the court is satisfied 
from the evidence presented that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the 
extent that the legitimate objects have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood 
that the marriage can be preserved.” The decree shall state that the dissolution is granted to “the 
parties.” Id. Fault has not been significant in reaching a property distribution since In re Marriage 
of Willcoxson, 250 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa. 1977), nor for alimony since In re Tjaden’s Marriage, 199 
N.W.2d 475 (Iowa. 1972). 
56 For a lengthy discussion of fault and no-fault legislation, a classification of all states, and an 
argument that fault should be excluded, see American Law Institute (2002:42-54). 
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somewhere in the files (frequently in the spouse’s affidavits).57 Thus, adultery 
could be identified from the files in 6 cases,58 domestic violence in 9,59 child 
abuse in 13.60 One case involved both child abuse and adultery,61 and one 
involved both child abuse and domestic violence. Twenty-six separate cases 
(18.6 %) therefore involved at least one type of fault. These fault cases were 
much less likely to settle and, even holding the failure to settle constant, much 
more likely to produce substantial post-divorce litigation. This finding confirms 
what women’s advocates62 and mediators (Gaughan, 1981:39-41, 63)63 have 
been arguing for some years: these cases are simply poor candidates for 
mediation. Significant Pearson correlations64 show that fault was positively 
related to provisions regarding religious education and training (suggesting that 
couples with strong religious preferences needed more than just incompatibility 
to justify leaving marriages, or that these marriages were simply better ones),65
and was more common in marriages that had not accumulated more than 
57 This result was predicted in Wardle (1991) (presenting what might be termed a “hydraulic” 
model in which fault that is suppressed in the divorce proceedings surfaces elsewhere). 
58 Adultery was most commonly brought up by one spouse to reduce the other spouse’s 
chances of getting custody. There was also a suggestion in one case that the adulterous spouse 
squandered marital resources on the paramour. 
59 No-contact orders appeared in most of these files. Sometimes they did not appear directly, 
but were mentioned in affidavits involving limits on visitation. 
60 Usually these were in the context of petitions for temporary custody, sole custody, changes 
of custody, or limits on visitation. 
61 This was the only case of husband adultery, and the wife alleged “numerous male sex 
partners,” at least one of whom sexually abused the child in question. 
62 Probably the best known of these pieces is Lerman (1984). 
63 See also Lundstrom (1998): “It's not recommended for dissolving marriages troubled by 
violence, alcoholism, or mental impairment. And without the courts' discovery process, it doesn't 
work if either party is intent on hiding assets.” 
64 The correlation between two variables reflects the degree to which the variables are related. 
The most common measure of correlation is the Pearson Product Moment Correlation (called 
Pearson's correlation for short). Pearson's correlation reflects the degree of linear relationship 
between two variables. It ranges from +1 to -1. A correlation of +1 means that there is a perfect 
positive linear relationship between variables (that is, as one value increases, so does the other by 
proportionately as much).  
65 See, e.g., Nock et al. (2003): “The implications of such a finding are that successful marriages 
are not necessarily based on a religious foundation, but rather the values embraced by all major 
religions in regard to marriage serve the same purpose. In other words, it is the institutional view 
of marriage (a model that stresses the traditional vows of matrimony) that appears important, 
whether this is strictly religious or finds its source elsewhere. This is a theme we are currently 
investigating because we believe it is critical that we identify as many sources of strong marriages 
as possible. We suspect that such sources include a guiding template of normative beliefs, such 
as those shown in this presentation.” 
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$100,000 in assets. It was also closely associated with an age difference between 
husband and wife.66 
The role of attorneys also prominently features in this study. In each case, we 
knew who represented the petitioner and respondent. We counted how many 
cases in the sample each attorney handled for wives, husbands, and in total, 
and found that attorney experience made a substantial difference (usually in a 
positive direction), both in contract terms chosen and in how the parties 
adjusted over time to changing circumstances. Having an attorney experienced 
in family law ultimately proved cost-effective for most of the subjects of this 
study.67 
Can we predict which cases will settle and which will litigate? Here attorney 
experience, by any of our measures, was uncorrelated with choice of dispute 
resolution. Neither was wealth or income. However, if one of the parties 
ultimately was chosen as a sole custodian (less than 30% visitation time given 
to the other party), the parties were far less likely to settle.68 Where fault was 
involved, there was also less settlement (as we discussed before).  
Which terms promote fewer conflicts over time? We can answer this question 
using either a positive or negative approach. The positive one asks how often 
the parties were able to reach consensus or modify the contract after divorce. 
Here total attorney experience and experience of the wife’s attorney were 
significantly related. Consensual modification was significantly (at the .01 level) 
more likely as the number of children increased, when the first child was older, 
and if the parties had an ongoing business partnership (such as a Christmas 
tree farm, interest in a patent, or stock options in a company). In fact, an 
ongoing economic tie was associated with many desirable things in this study: 
longer marriages before divorce, greater accumulation of assets, more 
experienced attorneys (both for husbands and in total), and more independent 
wealth of wives. Consensual modification was also more likely if either the wife 
or the husband had independent wealth, and if the parties included a term for 
an automatic adjustment of child support based on income changes of the 
parents. 
66 For an explanation of why that might be, based upon gendered variance in sexual interest 
over the life-course, see Allen and Brinig (1998). 
67 The exceptions are the number of post-divorce litigation events, which increases positively 
with the number of case for husbands handled by husband’s attorney, and the prediction of 
whether there will be post divorce litigation at all, which varied positively with the total number 
of cases in the sample handled by both attorneys. 
68 As my colleague Jerry Wetlaufer points out, judges may be more apt to award sole custody 
when the parties cannot get along well enough to agree to any sort of complicated sharing of 
time with children. It is difficult to sort out cause and effect, in other words. 
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The negative approach looks at post-divorce litigation (usually motions or 
sometimes enforcement mechanisms). There was more litigation when the first 
child was older, as the number of children increased, and when the total 
experience of the attorneys increased, and significantly less of it when the 
parties provided for an automatic adjustment based upon the child’s age. 
Surprisingly, traditional power variables such as income and independent 
wealth played little role in what the parties agreed to (or whether they were able 
to live with their agreement).69 Obviously, higher income parents (who were 
most likely college educated themselves in our highly educated county) were 
more apt to include college educations for their children in the agreements. So 
were women who married when they were older (probably because they were 
highly educated themselves or had more job experience). College education 
provisions were predictably more frequent with older children, and when the 
wife was represented by an attorney handling more women’s cases in the 
sample. No couples who litigated included college education provisions in the 
final court-ordered decree.70 Higher income couples also had more assets and a 
greater variety of assets to divide. Greater wealth and higher income were, not 
surprisingly, associated closely with longer marriages. 
The agreements varied widely in their treatment of visitation: some did not 
include schedules at all, while others had very complex visitation schedules (up 
to 21 paragraphs of treatment). The more complicated the schedule, the less 
likely that one parent had “sole custody,” and the more likely that the attorneys 
involved were very experienced with other cases in the sample. These 
complicated schedules were also related to having provisions specifying 
religious upbringing and education. 
Provisions limiting or suggesting changes when the custodial spouse relocated 
were more common when the wife was older when she married, when the 
couple had assets of more than $100,000 and when the husband possessed 
independent wealth. The first correlation suggests that these wives might be 
more mobile, while the last two suggest that there might be property in Iowa 
that would be difficult for the non-custodial parent to leave behind. 
69 Nor did the age of the wife at marriage. Generally speaking, women who marry young are 
less likely to have completed an education or launched a career before having children. Women 
who delayed marriage until completing education or having significant job experience were likely 
to have better employment opportunities outside marriage and therefore to be in a better 
bargaining position. 
70 Iowa Code § 598.21 (5)(A) (2001) justifies a college education award of up to 1/3 from each 
parent. Litigating couples might not have included college provisions because they were simply 
too bitter to be thinking in long range terms about their children at this time, or because they’d 
expended the resources that would otherwise be set aside for the children’s education. 
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Beginning with the knowledge gained from running the simple correlations, we 
can go more deeply into causation than we can just by seeing that if one thing 
increases, another changes in some way. As social scientists know, this is never 
an exact science, for some portion (and in these cases, a large amount) of the 
change in the dependent variable is not explained by the “right-hand side” or 
independent variables. For example, we can take three factors that we know are 
all correlated with fault divorces: whether or not the couple had a provision on 
religious education or upbringing in their settlement agreement, whether or not 
they had accumulated assets over $100,000 and the age difference of the 
spouses. We speculated earlier that more religious couples might feel more 
comfortable alleging fault if they decided to end a marriage.71 That is, for 
religious reasons, they believe they should not abandon a marriage without very 
significant reason. In legal terms, these reasons translate into the traditional 
fault grounds of adultery and marital violence (abuse). Adultery has been 
recognized as a reason for divorce since Biblical times. Marital violence has 
been grounds for a legal separation at least since the first divorces were granted 
in colonial America.72 But the fault that might break up a marriage will likely 
have occurred before the contract (including the religious upbringing) is 
drafted: that is, the direction of the causation is more likely from fault to the 
contract provision rather than the other way around: greater religiosity, which 
we cannot measure, likely affects both variables. We nonetheless would predict 
a positive sign on the variable. The age difference variable should also have a 
positive sign, though here the direction is clearer: whatever changed about the 
marital dynamic because the spouses had a bigger gap between their ages likely 
occurred long before they drafted the contract. Finally, we consider the assets 
over $100,000 variable. In a turbulent marriage, one would predict that it 
would be less likely that the parties would accumulate substantial assets. Many 
studies have found that both domestic violence and child abuse complaints 
71 It is possible, though not so likely, that more religious people commit more abuse or 
adultery. This behavior would certainly be contrary to the doctrine of mainstream religions, if 
not all religions. 
72 For a discussion of the historical treatment of fault at divorce, see Brinig and Carbone 
(1988:860-61). Before 1600, the Catholic Church interpreted Matthew 5:31 (“Whosoever shall 
put away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery: and he that 
shall marry her that is put away, committeth adultery”) to mean that validly contracted marriages 
could not be dissolved. The Church formalized this position at the Council of Trent in 1563 
(Phillips, 1988:34-46). Annulment was available because without a marriage there was no bond to 
dissolve. For other discussions, see Brinig and Crafton (1994:876-77); Rheinstein (1956:654); and 
Hartog (1991). 
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increase as families are less wealthy,73 so we would expect a negative 
coefficient. In fact, just looking at the abuse cases, the coefficient is negative, 
but not significant at the .05 level of confidence. So it seems that it is not just 
abuse, but the six adultery cases that play a role here. This observation is borne 
out by what we have seen before about adultery—the claim sometimes was 
made in the context of wasting marital assets on the paramour, which should 
have a negative impact on family wealth. Table III shows what happens if we 
combine all three factors:74 we can predict nearly .12 of the difference in the 
probability of fault in these cases. Two of the three factors are statistically 
significant at less than the .05 level, and the probability of fault being involved 
more than quintuples if the couple has a provision on religious education in 
their agreement. 
The causation question can be more nearly sorted out by looking at the 
regressions as a series of questions, each of which produces a result in an 
equation (called Two Stage Least Squared or 2SLS). Because the first equation 
in each series (predicting the existence or not of a contract provision) is binary, 
the method for doing a 2SLS becomes (1) estimate the existence of the 
contract provision using a Logistic Regression, and (2) estimate the result (here, 
the number of consensual modifications, the number of post-litigation events, 
or whether or not there is post-divorce litigation based upon a saved predicted 
probability from (1) plus new predictors). Thus, the model for Tables IV and V 
is as follows: 
(1) Automatic Income Adjustment in Agreement (AI) = f(Experience of 
Wife’s Attorney (EW), Fault in Case (F), Independent Wealth of Wife 
(IW)), and 
(2) Number of Consensual Modifications (CM) = f(AI (predicted), 
Continuing Business or Partnership (CB), and Number of Children (C)).75 
Attorneys who have more experience handling cases for women (measured by 
those they handled during 1998) are likely to suggest that their clients ask for 
automatic increases in child support. They probably choose the income 
73 This does not mean that abuse is confined to the impoverished, just that there tends to be 
more of it when resources are scarce (particularly if abusers are unemployed) (Kurz, 1995). 
74 Note that because we are including a contract provision, we need to confine our analysis to 
those cases settled rather than all of the cases. If the same regression is done with the entire 
sample, the R2 is .096, but the coefficients remain significant and have the same sign. 
75 When Equation 2 is estimated, instrumental variables include all those from Equation 1. 
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variation because it is easier to justify, since the Guidelines themselves are 
structured around income differences,76 and proof of income changes will not 
be difficult if tax forms are submitted each year. However, proof will be more 
difficult if the spouses inherently do not trust each other, as is the case when 
fault is alleged. They should be less likely to ask for adjustments in income 
when they have less independent wealth to rely on, because poorer wives will 
need to rely on steady child support just to make ends meet. (Child support will 
decrease, as well as increase, automatically based upon changes in the 
husband’s income.) 
I hypothesized that the parties would find it much less painful to adjust over 
time when they had provided for changes in their agreement, so the predicted 
sign on the Automatic Income Adjustment (AI) was positive. I included 
ongoing business or partnership not only because there had been a positive 
correlation, but because I had anecdotal evidence, from people I knew and 
from reported cases, of couples who could successfully continue business 
enterprises but who had problems living together as married couples.77 I also 
suspected that with more children involved, more cooperation over time would 
be needed (and, remember, the litigated cases have been screened out here). 
Results are shown in Tables IV through IX. As I hypothesized, the predicted 
probability of the automatic adjustment of child support based upon income 
was positively and significantly (at .065) related to the number of consensual 
modifications (Table V).78 So was a continuing business or partnership (at 
.0484),79 and the existence of such an economic partnership contributed more 
than any other variable to the final equation. The number of children was also 
significant (at .0217).80 These results are all intuitive: if the parties are required, 
76 Thus the husband’s income determines the columns, wife’s the rows, on the chart. 
77 For example, the cafeteria at George Mason Law School was run for at least ten years by a 
divorced couple, John and Nancy Martin. The man was the heir to the department store that 
became the law school building, and his wife did the cooking. The litigated cases include Bass v. 
Bass, 814 S.W. 2d 38 (Tenn. 1991) (video game and diner partnership).  
78 We can use the equations generated by the regressions to get some idea of the magnitude of 
the effects. Holding other variables at their means and using the coefficients of the tables, if we 
vary only the existence or not of the modification provision, the number of modifying 
amendments changes from essentially zero (.011) to .5904149. The mean values were .02970 (for 
the provision), .06 (business), and 1.75 (number of children). 
79 Using the procedure outlined in the preceding footnote, but this time varying only the 
existence or not of the continuing business relationship, the number of modifying amendments 
changes from essentially zero (.009) to 2.2654557. 
80 Using the procedure above, but varying the number of children from 1 (since all couples had 
at least one child) to 2, the number of provisions increased by .20. 
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for economic or personal reasons, to be cooperative over some period of time, 
they are likely, in this kind of “friendly divorce,” to adjust. 
Next, we turn to the less happy question of what produces continued 
litigation. The contract provision (as opposed to failure to settle at all) that was 
correlated with post-litigation events turns out to be another automatic child 
support adjustment, this time for the age of the child. We would predict that, 
like the automatic adjustment for income, this type of planning ahead would be 
related to better behavior (that is, it would be negatively related to the number 
of post-divorce litigation events). The first step is to predict the likelihood of 
such a provision, again using a logistic regression. (See Table VI). Correlations 
revealed that such adjustments were more likely when the parties 
simultaneously agreed to vary the amount of child support from the Guidelines 
amount, and that the likelihood should increase as the variance increased. Why 
might this be so? These couples might see the need for generous provision for 
children, and might recognize (as is the truth) that the child’s needs would 
increase as the child aged (ALI, 2002:§3.05A, Comment l, at 603). This 
tendency would be more likely when there was a big discrepancy between the 
husband’s income (typically the non-custodial parent) and the wife’s (typically 
the primary custodial parent). 
As noted, the automatic adjustment of child support should be inversely 
related to the number of post-divorce litigation events. The interesting factor in 
these equations (and the reason we have included Table VIII) is the role of the 
experienced attorney for the husband. Though this was statistically unrelated to 
provisions specifying age-related adjustments (though it was negative—these 
provisions are sought by women and their attorneys), the husband’s attorney’s 
experience was positively related to the number of post-litigation events,81 and, 
when the child support deviation was included as an instrumental variable, 
statistically significant (at .03) and with a larger standardized coefficient than 
the predicted probability term. What are these attorneys doing? Most likely, 
they try to limit automatic provisions of this kind, which can only increase (as 
opposed to the income-based ones, which can decrease as well). If the 
provisions are included, later litigation (to resist collection of child support, 
81 To get some idea of the magnitude here, by plugging actual (as opposed to predicted) 
average values into the equation and varying only the experience of the attorney handling 
husbands’ cases by adding one more case in the sample, the number of post-divorce litigation 
events increased from 1.62555 for the attorney who handled the average number of cases 
(2.7021) to 2.0320073 if the attorney handled just one more divorce case for a husband in the 
sample. Comparing this with contracts that did or didn’t have modifications based upon the 
child’s age, again plugging in mean values otherwise into the equation, the number of post-
litigation events without the provision was 8.80, and with the provision .456634 (a very 
significant decrease indeed). 
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decrease amounts paid or change custody) may be sought when their (male) 
clients claim that their ex-wives are not granting sufficient visitation, are not 
spending the child support money on the child, do not need the amount 
provided for in the agreement, and so forth. 
Finally, in Table IX we consider how well the automatic adjustments for age 
and other factors predict the presence or absence of any adversarial post-
divorce litigation. Since the dependent variable is binary, again we run a logistic 
regression. We would predict, based upon our prior discussion of them, that 
the coefficient for an automatic age-based adjustment would be negative, and 
that the coefficient for the presence of fault grounds (child abuse, domestic 
violence or adultery would be positive). This time we include two other factors. 
One is another provision: religious education or upbringing, which might be 
positive, since it is related to the presence of fault grounds, or negative, if it 
indicated a more forgiving attitude or greater concern for the children. We also 
included an attorney experience provision: the number of cases in the sample 
handled by both husband’s and wife’s attorneys. This, we would guess, would 
be positive, because experienced attorneys (holding the agreements the parties 
wrote constant) would enforce agreements for support and visitation before 
arrearages accumulated significantly or denial of visitation became a big 
problem. 
As Table IX shows, all these factors were significant. The most important, 
more than tripling the likelihood of litigation (and significant at .096), is the 
presence of fault.82 The second most influential coefficient was the attorney 
experience variable, significant at .005. Decreasing by more than 36% were 
both the provision for automatic adjustment of child support and the religious 
education provision, significant at .033 and .046, respectively. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
What can we learn from Johnson County divorce files? First, many factors that 
Mnookin and Kornhauser (and economist Elizabeth Peters) would have 
predicted would be important do not seem to have really large effects. How 
custody is arranged (except in cases where visitation is really limited) does not 
affect much in terms of litigation or the terms of the agreement. Child support 
always ceases when the child becomes emancipated or reaches majority.83
Neither does the most obvious indication of power, the absolute and relative 
82 For a discussion of the importance of real as opposed to statistical significance, see 
McCloskey and Siliak (1996). 
83 Iowa Code § 598.1 (6) (2001), with exceptions for children in college between 18 and 22 or 
children of any age who remain dependent because of disability. 
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incomes of husband and wife (though differences in income do matter in the 
equation on automatic adjustment for the age of the child).  
However, some factors do matter. The most obvious of these is the presence 
of child abuse, domestic violence or adultery. In cases where these traditional 
marital “fault grounds” appear, we see much less cooperative behavior either in 
terms of coming to a settlement, including automatic adjustment terms, or 
post-divorce litigation (even for those spouses able to come to written 
agreements). In a positive vein, we see in a number of cases the importance of 
some sort of ongoing business or partnership in enabling divorcing spouses to 
work out their problems. Finally, the previous experience of the attorneys 
involved in the case seems to be critical in terms of getting clients to come to 
settlement and to agree on terms that will help them adjust over time (though 
there may be more litigation after the divorce, particularly if the former 
husbands have experienced attorneys).84 
This brings us back to our original prediction that parties will select contract 
terms to minimize potential losses. Unlike the commercial franchise contracts 
with which it shares many features, the separation agreement (or stipulation) 
typically cannot last for a short time specified in advance, thus reducing the risk 
of big losses. When children are involved, provisions for their custody and 
support must control through their minority,85 in the analyzed cases at least 
four years. 
84 Husbands brought actions for change of custody, especially when wives attempted to move 
out of the area. They resisted increases in child support, sometimes counterclaiming for more 
custody time. Both of these actions are fully consistent with attorney experience. It is less 
obvious why in eight cases, experienced family law attorneys would help their clients resist child 
support collection efforts by the wives. Of these eight, one attorney represented three clients, 
and two others represented two of them. These attorneys may have a reputation as “gunners” 
who will litigate. Analysis of all of the cases they handled supports this conclusion. Each had well 
above the mean pre- and post- divorce litigation events (1.67, 5.67 and 3.33 before stipulation 
compared to the overall mean of 1.35; and 2.67, 3.67 and 2.83 post-divorce litigation events 
compared to an overall mean of 1.6). Those with reputations for conflict are generally supposed 
to be less successful than those who cooperate, see, e.g., Sobel (1985); Painter  (1996:150); 
Johnston and Waldfogel (2002); and Gilson and Mnookin (1994:545-46) (describing matrimonial 
practice as one in which attorneys can cooperate even though their clients are not equipped to 
do so; and one cooperative attorney as reporting “If a client is hell bent upon hiring an advocate 
to disembowel the adverse party, I direct them elsewhere"). This may not be true, though, for 
first amendment or consumer advocate lawyers, see Hollander-Blumoff  (1995). 
85 Courts invalidate provisions designed to remove judicial oversight from child support or 
custody cases. For example, Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1973), holds that an 
agreement by a custodial parent to waive child support in return for a promise by the non-
custodial parent not to exercise visitation rights was void as contrary to public policy. See also 
Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 7 Va. App. 55, 371 S.E.2d 845 (1988). Also see Iowa Code 598.21(8): 
“A modification of a support order…is not valid unless the modification is approved by the 
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However, many of the contracts in the Johnson County sample contained 
other terms that suggest the parties were trying to minimize their losses. For 
example, the provisions for automatic adjustments (for age or income) 
minimize the possibility of getting a larger (to the non-custodial spouse) or 
smaller (to the custodial spouse) amount should the matter be relitigated at a 
later date. In other words, they reduce the variance in the amount of future 
child support.86
Most of the studied divorce settlements provided for some reasonable share 
of physical custody to go to each parent: there was no complete loss of custody 
in any but a few extreme cases.87 In a related vein, a number of the agreements 
provided that children could not be moved out of a specified area (sometimes 
the metropolitan area, sometimes within 50 or 100 miles, sometimes out of 
state) without the relocation becoming a change of circumstances requiring 
reassessment of custody. For a non-custodial parent, the greatest fear may well 
be losing touch with one’s children by having them move away.  
All alimony awards that were agreed to (and, remember, there were only 8 of 
these) were for fixed periods (in only two cases for more than 60 months, and 
one of these was for $1 per month). For the payor spouses (all husbands), this 
short term would limit their exposure, potentially for the remainder of their 
working careers.  
court, after proper notice and opportunity to be heard is given to all parties to the order, and 
entered as an order of the court.”  
86 For a discussion of the reduction of variance in the context of the parole evidence rule, see 
Posner (1998:542): “This alternative characterization would not affect the analysis for parties that 
are risk-averse, since such parties are willing to pay for a reduction in variance. Even risk-neutral 
parties would prefer the reduction in variance because the uncertainty of the legal decision in 
case of a dispute would cause parties to incur greater litigation costs than they would if the legal 
decision could be accurately predicted.” 
87 About a quarter of these involved allegations of abuse of a child or the other parent. 
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Table I.  Descriptive Statistics - All Cases
Descriptive Statistics-All Cases N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Date of Stipulation 138 1998.00 2001.00 1998.7246 .72261
Petitioner (w=1) 107 0 1 .78 .419
Date of Marriage 135 09/11/1971 10/15/1998 07/24/1989 11/18/1588
Age of Wife 138 22.00 52.00 34.0290 6.95338
Age of Husband 136 20.00 55.00 35.8382 7.48452
Difference in Spouses’ Ages 135 .00 15.00 3.3185 3.22456
Wife’s attorney cases for wives in 
sample 130 1.00 10.00 3.9231 2.72973
Husband’s attorney cases for 
husbands in sample 94 1.00 6.00 2.7021 1.80101
More experienced attorney 
(abs 11-13)
57 .00 7.00 2.2105 1.67691
Number of Children 140 1 5 1.75 .760
Age of Child1 (Year of Birth) 141 1975 1998 1990.35 4.953
Sex of Child 1 (1=girl) 137 0 1 .42 .496
Age of Child 2 (Year of Birth) 82 1979 1997 1991.06 4.029
Sex of Child 2 (1=girl) 80 0 1 .48 .503
Age of Child 3 16 1983 1998 1991.06 4.328
Sex of Child 3 (1=girl) 16 0 1 .44 .512
Prior Actions 140 0 1 .14 .344
Fault grounds? (domestic 
violence, child abuse, adultery 
seen in file)
140 0 3 .32 .771
Income W ($ / year) 118 0 145600 24077.53 19631.983
Income H ($ / year) 117 0 341477 37720.20 39275.416
Guidelines Figure ($ / month) 115 0 5000 606.33 604.386
Independent wealth W 131 0 1 .06 .240
Independent wealth H 132 0 1 .11 .319
Valuable assets (more than 
$100K)
134 0 1 .22 .418
Joint Legal Custody (1=yes) 139 0 1 .90 .302
Physical Custody 
Arrangement(1=W, 0=H) 137 0 2 .89 .354
Physical custody less than 30% 
for non-custodial (1=yes) 131 0 1 .31 .462
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Child Support Deviation (actual 
awarded, $/month) 111 0 5000 504.63 590.875
Automatic Adjustment-Kid's Age 
(1=yes) 132 0 1 .86 .352
Automatic Adjustment-Income 
(1=yes) 131 0 1 .38 .488
College Expenses (1=yes) 135 0 1 .27 .448
Alimony (1=yes) 139 0 1 .08 .271
Method of Resolution 
(1=stipulation)
141 0 1 .88 .327
Allegations of Abuse 
(1=allegation)
141 0 1 .14 .350
Disposition of Marital Home
 (0=to one; 1=equal) 88 0 1 .24 .429
Complicated Visitation Schedule 
(number of paragraphs)
139 0 21 5.31 4.614
Limitation on Removing Kids from 
State (1=yes)
140 0 1 .28 .450
Religious Education/Observances 
(1=mentioned)
140 0 1 .21 .412
Post-contract litigation (prior to 
divorce--temporary support or 
custody (1=yes)
141 0 15 1.58 2.211
Post-divorce litigation (1=yes) 141 0 1 .65 .480
How many post-divorce (motions, 
hearings, etc.)
141 0 13 1.96 2.455
Consensual modifications 141 0 3 .30 .557
Ongoing business/partnership 141 0 1 .06 .232
Date Stipulation Signed 139 12/29/1997 08/30/2001 03/31/1999 06/16/1583
Date Stipulation Entered 141 01/06/1998 09/05/2001 04/16/1999 06/19/1583
Length of Marriage 
(years & fraction)
135 .45 31.29 10.9927 6.90206
Age of wife at time of marriage 133 2.47 50.05 23.1445 9.55178
resolut=1 (FILTER) 141 0 1 .88 .327
Difference between H and W 
income
116 -136448.00 221477.00 13737.6205 37188.72290
Predicted probability that has 
adjustment for income 107 .02970 .86215 .4106159 .20580923
Valid N (listwise) 0
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Table II.  Comparison of Litigate and Settle Groups










0 12 0.83 0.389 0.112
Petitioner (w=1)
1 95 0.77 0.424 0.044
0 17 32.0588 7.33545 1.77911
Age of Wife
1 121 34.3058 6.88458 0.62587
0 16 33.3125 7.79503 1.94876
Age of Husband
1 120 36.175 7.41072 0.6765
0 16 3.3125 3.49702 0.87426
Age Difference
1 119 3.3193 3.20205 0.29353
0 16 4.0625 2.46221 0.61555
Attorney's cases for W in sample
1 114 3.9035 2.77463 0.25987
0 12 2.1667 1.85047 0.53418
Attorney's cases for H in sample
1 82 2.7805 1.79178 0.19787
0 6 1.8333 1.16905 0.47726More experienced attorney (abs 11-
13) 1 51 2.2549 1.73024 0.24228
0 17 1.65 1.057 0.256
Number of Children
1 123 1.76 0.714 0.064
0 17 1992.29 4.524 1.097
Age of Child1 (Year of Birth)
1 124 1990.08 4.966 0.446
0 16 0.38 0.5 0.125
Sex of Child 1 (1=girl)
1 121 0.43 0.497 0.045
0 17 0.35 0.493 0.119Fault grounds? (1=abuse, 2=child 
abuse, 3=adultery) 1 123 0.15 0.355 0.032
0 16 16569.13 8962.35 2240.587
Income W ($/year)
1 102 25255.31 20596.347 2039.342
0 15 36464.61 31413.775 8111.002
Income H ($/year)
1 102 37904.85 40430.123 4003.179
0 16 577.96 545.498 136.374
Guidelines Figure ($/month)
1 99 610.92 615.81 61.891
0 17 0 0 0
Independent Wealth W
1 114 0.07 0.257 0.024
0 17 0.12 0.332 0.081
Independent Wealth H
1 115 0.11 0.318 0.03
0 17 0.12 0.332 0.081
Valuable Assets (more than $100K)
1 117 0.24 0.429 0.04
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0 17 0.88 0.332 0.081
Joint Legal Custody (1=yes)
1 122 0.9 0.299 0.027
0 17 0.35 0.493 0.119
Attorney's Fees (0=each party)
1 120 0.22 0.414 0.038
0 17 1 0 0Physical Custody Arrangement(1=W, 
0=H) 1 120 0.87 0.375 0.034
0 17 0.53 0.514 0.125Physical custody less than 30% for 
non-custodial (1=yes) 1 114 0.27 0.447 0.042
0 13 548.99 395.904 109.804Child Support Deviation (Actual 
awarded, $/month) 1 98 498.74 613.38 61.961
0 17 0.76 0.437 0.106Automatic Adustment-Kid's Age 
(1=yes) 1 115 0.87 0.338 0.032
0 17 0.24 0.437 0.106Automatic Adjustment-Income 
(1=yes) 1 114 0.4 0.493 0.046
0 17 0.24 0.437 0.106
Other automatic adjustments (1=yes)
1 113 0.19 0.391 0.037
0 17 0.06 0.243 0.059
Non-Automatic Adjustments (1=yes)
1 115 0.23 0.42 0.039
0 17 0 0 0
College Expenses (1=yes)
1 118 0.31 0.466 0.043
0 17 0.59 0.507 0.123
Life Insurance (1=yes)
1 121 0.64 0.481 0.044
0 17 0.18 0.393 0.095
Alimony (1=yes)
1 122 0.07 0.249 0.023
0 16 0.38 0.5 0.125Dependency Exemptions (1=H, 
0=split, 3=W) 1 120 0.33 0.524 0.048
0 8 0.13 0.354 0.125Disposition of Marital Home (0=to 
one; 1=equal) 1 80 0.25 0.436 0.049
0 17 0.06 0.243 0.059
Divided IRA
1 124 0.17 0.377 0.034
0 17 4.24 3.401 0.825Complicated Visitation Schedule 
(number of paragraphs) 1 122 5.46 4.75 0.43
0 17 0.24 0.437 0.106Limitation on Removing Kids from
State (1=yes) 1 123 0.28 0.453 0.041
0 17 0.12 0.332 0.081Religious Education/Observances 
(1=mentioned) 1 123 0.23 0.421 0.038
Post-contract litigation (prior to 
divorce--temporary support or 
0 17 3.24 2.728 0.662
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custody (1=yes) 1 124 1.35 2.041 0.183
0 17 0.94 0.243 0.059
Post-divorce litigation (1=yes)
1 124 0.6 0.491 0.044
0 17 4.59 3.554 0.862How many post-divorce (motions, 
hearings, etc) 1 124 1.6 2.032 0.182
0 17 0.12 0.332 0.081
Consensual modifications
1 124 0.32 0.578 0.052
0 17 0.12 0.332 0.081
Ongoing business/partnership
1 124 0.05 0.215 0.019
0 0(a) . . .
Ongoing Tax Issues
1 0(a) . . .
0 17 8.1876 5.77772 1.4013
Length of Marriage (years & fraction)
1 118 11.3969 6.97762 0.64234
0 17 0.0375 0.15071 0.03655Time lapse between agreement and 
divorce 1 122 0.056 0.10924 0.00989
0 17 23.4402 8.97027 2.17561
Age of wife at time of marriage
1 116 23.1011 9.67024 0.89786
0 15 19657.5467 37265.50561 9621.91217
Difference between H and W income
1 101 12858.4236 37282.6129 3709.75864
Table III.  Predicting Fault (Abuse of Spouse or Child, Adultery seen in file)
Predicting Fault (Abuse of Spouse or Child, Adultery seen in File)
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
RELIGIOU 1.623 .599 7.333 1 .007 5.070
 AGEDIFF .109 .082 1.745 1 .187 1.115
 ASSETS -2.251 1.102 4.173 1 .041 .105
 Constant -2.287 .483 22.456 1 .000 .102
Cox & Snell R2=.119
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Table IV.  Predicting Provision Specifying Automatic Adjustment of Child 
Support Based Upon Income (Logistic Regression)
Predicting Provision Specifying Automatic Adjustment of Child Support Based 
Upon Income 
Variable B Std. Error B Beta T Sig. T
Number of Cases in Samples 
for Wife’s Attorney
.294 .089 10.856 1 .001
Fault Ground -1.506 .718 4.403 1 .036
Independent Wealth of Wife -1.656 .960 2.974 1 .085
(Constant) -1.193 .401 8.837 1 .003
Cox & Snell R2 =.166
Table V.  Predicting Number of Consensual Modifications, with Automatic 
Adjustment of Child Support Based on Income Endogenous88
Predicting Number of Consensual Modifications, 2SLS 
(Automatic Adjustment Based on Income)
Variable B SE  B Beta T Sig T
Predicted Probability of 
Provision that Child Support 
Adjusted for Income Variation
.601581 .322670 .200769 1.864 .0651
Continuing Business or 
Partnership
2.275271 1.138764 .872611 1.998 .0484
Number of Children .200629 .086073 .240820 2.331 .0217
(Constant) -.378783 .214621 -1.765 .0805
System R2 = .337; R2 for Equation (Adjusted) =.088.
88 Instrumental variables are number of cases for wives handled by wife’s attorney, fault 
grounds, independent wealth of wife and number of children. 
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Table VI.  Prediction of Provision Specifying Adjustment Based Upon Age 
of Child (Logistic)
Prediction of Provision Specifying Age-Based Adjustment
Variable Name B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Dollar Deviation from Child 
Support Guidelines
.006 .002 9.819 1 .002 1.006
Difference Between Husband’s 
and Wife’s Income
.000 .000 1.453 1 .228 1.000
Constant .091 .551 .027 1 .869 1.095
Cox & Snell R2 = .145
Table VII.  Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events, 
Adjustment Upon Age of Child Endogenous89
Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events, 2SLS (Age-Based 
Adjustment)





-8.349066 4.521190 -.900711 -1.847 .0738




.406455 .287559 .284257 1.413 .1669
(Constant) 7.707467 3.925458 1.963 .0581
System R2 =.43174; R2 for Equation (adjusted) =.13709
89 Instrumental variables are: fault grounds, religion provision in agreement, age of wife at 
marriage, length of marriage, non-custodial parent has less than 30% time with child, 
independent wealth of husband, and number of husband cases handled by attorney for husband 
in sample. 
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Table VIII.  Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events, 
Adjustment Upon Age of Child Endogenous, Includes Child Support 
Deviation90
Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events, Adjustment Upon Age of 
Child Endogenous, Includes Child Support Deviation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
Predicted Probability 
that Adjustment for 
Child’s Age
-3.024042 1.864674 -.326239 -1.622 .1144
Number of Cases 
Husband’s Attorney 
Handled for Men
.504775 .224963 .353017 2.244 .0317
(Constant) 3.183292 1.713702 1.858 .0722
System R2=.42469; R2 (Adjusted) =.16645
Table IX.  Prediction of Whether or Not There was Post-Divorce Litigation 
(Logistic)
Prediction of Whether or Not There was Post-Divorce Litigation
B S.E. Wald df Sig.
Exp(
B)
Fault Grounds 1.219 .732 2.774 1 .096 3.385
Handled by Husband’s and 
Wife’s Attorneys in Sample
.111 .039 8.014 1 .005 1.117
Provision for Automatic 
Adjustment for Age 
-1.007 .471 4.559 1 .033 .365
Religious Education Provision -1.017 .510 3.970 1 .046 .362
Constant
.099 .391 .064 1 .801 1.104
Cox & Snell R2=.138
90 Instrumental variables are fault grounds, religion provision in stipulation, age of wife at 
marriage, length of marriage, non-custodial parent has less than 30% time, independent wealth of 
husband, number of cases for husbands in sample handled by attorney for husband, and dollar 
deviation from guidelines for child support. 
"Unhappy Contracts":  The Case of Divorce Settlements / 269
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1007
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
References
Allen, Douglas W. 1992. “Marriage and Divorce: A Comment," 82 American Economic 
Review 297. 
________ and Margaret F. Brinig. 1998. “Sex, Property Rights and Divorce,” 5 
European Journal of Law and Economics 211.  
American Law Institute (ALI). 2002. Principles of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations. Philadelphia, PA: American Law Institute.  
Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Ayres, Ian, and Robert Gertner. 1989. “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules,” 99 Yale Law Journal 87.   
Barnett, Randy E. 1992. “Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational 
Theory of Contract,” 78 Virginia Law Review 1175.  
Betson, David, Eirik Evenhouse, Siobhan Reilly, and Eugene Smolensky. 1992. 
“Trade-Offs Implicit in Child Support Guidelines, 11 Journal of Public Analysis 
& Mgmt 1. 
Bix, Brian. 1998. “Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital 
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage,” 40 William & Mary Law 
Review 145. 
Braver, Sanford L., Marnie Whitley and Christine Ng. 1993. “Who Divorced Whom? 
Methodological and Theoretical Issues,” 20 Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 1. 
Brinig, Margaret F. 2004. “‘Unhappy Contracts’: The Structure and Effect of 
Telecommunication Interconnection Agreements,” Working Paper, 
University of Iowa, College of Law. 
________. 2001. “The Influence of Marvin v. Marvin on Housework During Marriage,” 
76 Notre Dame Law Review 1311. 
________. 2000. From Contract to Covenant: Beyond the Law and Economics of the Family. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
________. 1996. “The Family Franchise: Elderly Parents and Adult Siblings,” 1996 
Utah Law Review 393. 
________ and Michael V. Alexeev. 1993. “Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal 
Rules and Transaction Costs,” 8 Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 279. 
________ and Douglas W. Allen. 2000. “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why 
Women File for Divorce” 2 American Law and Economics Review 141.  
________ and F.H. Buckley. 1998. "No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People," 18(3) 
International Review of Law and Economics 325. 
________ and June Carbone, 1988. “The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce,” 
62 Tulane Law Review 853. 
________ and Steven M. Crafton. 1994. “Marriage and Opportunism,” 23 Journal of 
Legal Studies 869.  
_______ and Steven L. Nock. 2003. “‘I Only Want Trust’: Norms, Trust and 
Autonomy,” 32 Journal of Socio-economics 471. 
270 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1:2, 2005
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
Busch, Marc L., and Eric Reinhardt. 2000. “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes,” 24 Fordham International Law 
Journal 158. 
Buss, Emily. 1999. “Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of 
Child Clients,” 84 Cornell Law Review 895.  
Clarke, Sally C. 1995. “Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990,” 43 
Monthly Vital Statistics Report 2. 
Coase, Ronald H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1. 
Cohen, Lloyd. 1987. “Marriage, Divorce and Quasi-Rents: Or, ‘I Gave Him the Best 
Years of My Life,’” 16 Journal of Legal Studies 267. 
Dana, David, and Susan P. Koniak. 1999. “Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy,” 
148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 473. 
Ellman, Ira M., and Sharon L. Lohr. 1998. “Dissolving the Relationship Between 
Divorce Laws and Divorce Rates,” 18 International Review of Law & Economics
341. 
Elrod, Linda D., and Robert G. Spector. 2000. “A Review of the Year in Family Law: 
Century Ends with Unresolved Issues,” 33 Family Law Quarterly 865. 
Fay, Robert E. 1989. “The Disenfranchised Father,” 36 Advances in Pediatrics 407. 
Fisher, Helen E. 1992. Anatomy of Love: A Natural History of Mating, Marriage, and Why 
We Stray. New York: Fawcett Columbine. 
Fisher, Roger, and William Ury. 1991. Getting to Yes. New York, NY: Penguin Books. 
Ford, Christopher A. 1995. “War Powers as We Live Them: Congressional-Executive 
Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers Resolution,” 11 Journal of 
Law & Policy 609. 
Friedberg, Leona. 1998. “Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from 
Panel Data,” 88 American Economic Review 608. 
Garrison, Marsha. 1991. “Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s 
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes,” 57 Brooklyn Law Review
621. 
Gaughan, Lawrence D. 1981. "Taking a Fresh Look at Divorce Mediation," 17 Trial 39. 
Gillette, Clayton P. 1985. “Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term 
Contracts,” 69 Minnesota Law Review  521. 
________. 2002. “Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce,” 62 
Louisiana Law Review 1165. 
Gilson, Ronald J., and Robert H. Mnookin. 1994. “Disputing through Agents: 
Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation,” 94 Columbia Law 
Review 509. 
Goetz, Charles J., and Robert E. Scott. 1980. “Enforcing Promises: An Examination of 
the Basis of Contract,” 89 Yale Law Journal 1261.  
________ and ________. 1981. “Principles of Relational Contracts,” 67 Virginia Law 
Review 1089. 
Goldberg, Victor P. 1987. “Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing 
and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant,” 34 
UCLA Law Review 1083. 
"Unhappy Contracts":  The Case of Divorce Settlements / 271
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1007
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
Grillo, Trina. 1991. “The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women,” 100 
Yale Law Journal 1545. 
Hadfield, Gillian K. 1990. “Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts,” 42 Stanford Law Review 927. 
Hanson, Gary L. 1991. “Moral Reasoning and the Marital Exchange Relationship,” 131 
Journal of Social Psychology 71. 
Harrison, Jeffrey L. 1999. “Law and Socio-Economics," 49 Journal of Legal Education 
224. 
Hartog, Hendrik. 1991. “Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in Nineteenth Century 
America,” 80 Georgetown Law Journal 95. 
Hoffmann, Joseph L., Marcy L. Kahn and Steven W. Fisher. 2001. “Plea Bargaining in 
the Shadow of Death,” 69 Fordham Law Review 2313. 
Hollander-Blumoff, Rebecca. 1995. “Breaking Down Barriers” (Review), 1 Harvard 
Negotiation Law Review 257. 
Jankowiac, William, James Donovan, and Elizabeth Hill. 1989. "Gender, Sexual 
Orientation, and Truth of Consensus in Studies of Physical Attractiveness," 
26(2) Journal of Sex Research 264. 
Johnson, John H., 1999. “Do Long Work Hours Contribute to Divorce?,” manuscript, 
Department of Economics, University of Illinois. 
Johnston, Jason Scott, and Joel Waldfogel. 2002. “Does Repeat Play Elicit 
Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation,” 31 Journal of Legal 
Studies 39.  
Kelly, Michael, and Greer Litton Fox. 1993. “Determinants of Alimony Awards,” 44 
Syracuse Law Review 641. 
Kornhauser, Lewis A. 1983. “Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract,” 26 Journal 
of Law & Economics 691. 
Kozlowski, Kim. 2004. “Divorced Mich. Fathers Sue for Equity in Child Custody,” 
Detroit News, 10/31/2004, http://www.detnews.com/2004/metro/0410/31/a01-
320553.htm.
Kurz, Demie. 1995. For Richer, For Poorer: Mothers Confront Divorce. New York, NY: 
Routledge.  
Landes, Elizabeth M. 1978. “The Economics of Alimony,” 7 Journal of Legal Studies 35. 
_______ and Richard A. Posner. 1978. “The Economics of the Baby Shortage,” 7 
Journal of Legal Studies 323. 
Leatherby, Wilbur C. 1987. “Preparing the Client for Successful Negotiation, 
Mediation and Litigation,” in Sanford L. Katz, ed. Negotiation to Settlement in 
Divorce. Clifton, NJ: Prentice Hall Law and Business. 
Lerman, Lisa. 1984. "Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal 
Dispute Resolution on Women," 7 Harvard Women's Law Journal 57. 
Lundberg, Shelley, and Robert Pollack. 1993. “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the 
Marriage Market,” 101 Journal of Political Economy 988. 
Lundstrom, Meg. 1998. “A Way to Take the War Out of Divorce,” Business Week, Nov. 
16, 1998. 
272 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1:2, 2005
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
Maccoby, Eleanor, and Robert H. Mnookin. 1992. Dividing the Child: Social and Legal 
Dilemmas of Custody. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Macaulay, Stewart. 1963. “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study,” 28 American Sociology Review 55.  
________. 1978. “Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of 
Contract,” 11 Law & Society Review 507. 
Macneil, Ian R. 1978. “Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,” 72 Northwestern 
University Law Review 854. 
________. 1980. The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Marks, Nadine F. 1996. "Flying Solo at Midlife: Gender, Marital Status, and 
Psychological Well-Being," 58 Journal of Marriage & Family 917. 
Marvell, Thomas B. 1989. “Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement,” 23 Law & 
Society Review 543. 
McAdams, Richard H. 2000. “A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law,” 86 Virginia 
Law Review 1649. 
McCloskey, Dierdre D., and Stephen H. Siliak. 1996. “The Standard Error of 
Regressions,” 34 Journal of Economic Literature 97. 
Mechoulan, Stéphane. 2001. "Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American 
Family," Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Toronto. 
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. “The Role of 
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and 
the Champagne Fairs,” 2 Economics & Policy 1.  
Mnookin, Robert H., and Lewis H. Kornhauser. 1979. “Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale Law Journal 950.   
Nakonezy, Paul A., Robert D. Shull, and Joseph Lee Rodgers. 1995. “The Effect of 
No-Fault Divorce Law on the Divorce Rates Across the 50 States and Its 
Relation to Income, Education and Religiosity,” 57 Journal of Marriage and the 
Family 477. 
von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. The Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Nock, Steven L. 1998. Marriage in Men’s Lives. New York: Oxford University Press.  
________, Laura Sanchez, Julia C. Wilson, and James D. Wright. 2003. “Intimate 
Equity, The Early Years of Covenant Marriage,” Paper presented at the 
Population Association of America meetings, Minneapolis, May, 2003. 
O'Rourke, Maureen. 1997. “Legislative Inaction on the Information Superhighway: 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law,” 3 Boston University Journal of 
Science and Technology Law 8. 
Painter, Richard W. 1996. “Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the 
Uneasy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers,” 65 
Fordham Law Review 149.  
Parkman, Allen. 1992. “Unilateral Divorce and the Labor Force Participation Rate of 
Married Women, Revisited," 82 American Economic Review 671.  
"Unhappy Contracts":  The Case of Divorce Settlements / 273
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1007
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
Peters, H. Elizabeth. 1986. “Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and 
Private Contracting,” 76 American Economic Review 437. 
Peterson, Mark, Syam Sarma, and Michael Shanley. 1987. Punitive Damages: Empirical 
Findings. Santa Monica, CA: Institute for Civil Justice, Rand. 
Phillips, Roderick. 1988. Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society. 
Cambridge, New York, NY:  Cambridge University Press. 
Posner, Eric A. 1998. “The Parole Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the 
Principles of Contractual Interpretation,” 146 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 533. 
________. 2000. Law and Social Norms. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Posner, Richard A. 1987. “The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions,” 67 Boston 
University Law Review 59.   
Reissmann, Catherine Kohler. 1990. Divorce Talk: Men and Women Make Sense of Personal 
Relationships. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Rheinstein, Max. 1956. “The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability,” 9 
Vanderbilt Law Review 633.  
Rossi, Jim. 2001. “Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public 
Interest in Rulemaking Settlement,” 51 Duke Law Journal 1015. 
Schwartz, Alan. 1992. “Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete 
Agreements and Judicial Strategies,” 21 Journal of Legal Studies 271.  
Scott, Elizabeth S., and Robert E. Scott. 1998. “Marriage as Relational Contract,” 84 
Virginia Law Review 1225. 
Scott, Robert E. 1987. “Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts,” 75 
California Law Review 2005. 
________. 1990. “A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts,” 
19 Journal of Legal Studies 597. 
________. 2000. “The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract,” 94 Northwestern 
University Law Review 847. 
Sobel, Joel. 1985. “A Theory of Credibility,” 52 Review of Economic Studies 557. 
Speidel, Richard E. 2000. “The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts,” 
94 Northwestern University Law Review 854. 
________. 1985. “Symposium: Law, Private Governance and Continuing 
Relationships,” 1985 Wisconsin Law Review 483. 
Standen, Jeffrey. 1993. “Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines,” 81 California 
Law Review 1471.  
Trebilcock, Michael J. 1993. The Limits of Freedom of Contract. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Ward, Stephanie Francis. 2003. “Child Support Battle Keeps Coming Back: Two 
Defeats Won’t Stop Dads’ Fight Against Guidelines,” ABA Journal, May 16, 
2003. 
Wardle, Lynn. 1991. “No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum,” 1991 BYU Law 
Review 79.  
Wax, Amy L. 1998. “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for 
Egalitarian Marriage?” 84 Virginia Law Review 509.  
274 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1:2, 2005
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
Weintraub, Russell J. 1992. “A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy,” 1992 Wisconsin 
Law Review 1. 
Weiss, Yoram, and Robert Willis. 1993. “Transfers Among Couples in Divorce 
Settlements,” 11 Journal of Labor Economics 629. 
Weitzman, Lenore. 1985. The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for Women and Children in America. New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster Children's Publishing. 
Whitehead, Barbara Dafoe. 1997. The Divorce Culture. New York: Alfred Knopf. 
Yarkon, Rachel H. 1997. “Note - Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawyers: Negotiated 
Settlement of Gender Discrimination Claims Arising from Termination of 
Employment,” 2 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 165. 
"Unhappy Contracts":  The Case of Divorce Settlements / 275
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1007
Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM
